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Abstract—Today, permissions management solutions on mobile
devices employ Identity Based Access Control (IBAC) models. If
this approach was suitable when people had only a few games
(like Snake or Tetris) installed on their mobile phones, the current
situation is different. A survey from Google in 2013 showed that,
on average, US users have installed 33 applications on their
Android smartphones. As a result, these users must manage
hundreds of permissions to protect their privacy. Scalability of
IBAC is a well-known issue and many more advanced access
control models have introduced abstractions to cope with this
problem. However, such models are more complex to handle by
non-technical users. Thus, we present a permission management
system for Android devices that 1) learns users’ privacy pref-
erences, 2) proposes them abstract authorization rules, and 3)
provides advanced features to manage these high-level rules. We
prove this approach is more efficient than current permission
management system by comparing it to Privacy Guard Manager.
I. INTRODUCTION
Android software development kit allows developers to
access hardware features of Android devices like GPS location
or the camera but also users’ data such as contact lists or
calendars. To actually have access to each feature, developers
have to request the associated permissions in a manifest file.
On versions 4.4 and 5, which are today the most deployed,
users are informed of the permissions an application requires
during the installation. At that time, they only have one
choice: accept to provide the application with unlimited access
to all the requested permissions or decline and cancel the
installation.
Additional permission management systems (such as Pri-
vacy Guard Manager, Permission Master, XPrivacy or Don-
keyGuard) can be installed to enhance the basic native Android
system by allowing users to modify permissions after the
installation of applications. All these permission management
applications follow an Identity Based Access Control model,
i.e., the user has to control every permission for every installed
application. Although IBAC allows fine-grained access con-
trol, it is not suitable for managing hundreds of permissions.
Scalability issue has been studied by the access control models
research community that proposed the use of abstractions
leading to high-level authorization rules making global access
control policies more understandable. Nonetheless, applying
these models requires to understand the associated abstractions
and thus suffer accessibility for non-technical users.
More than just a need, privacy is a right [1]. We must
give users a way to control the disclosure of their private
data. In this article, we present a recommender-based system,
called Kapuer (KAPUER is an Assistant for Protection of
Users pErsonnal infoRmation), that assists people in managing
permissions on their Android device. Kapuer includes a ma-
chine learning algorithm, which extends the study performed
in [2], to capture users’ preferences in terms of privacy. These
preferences when validated by users, are transformed into
XACML V3 policies. We developed a plug-in based on the
Xposed1 framework that enforces the XACML policies. Ka-
puer also includes additional permission management features
to enhance its efficiency to understand and visualize abstract
authorization rules.
Kapuer is freely available to download at the following
address: http://www.kapuer.org.
The rest of the article is structured as follow: first, we
review and discuss access control management approaches
applied to Android. In Section 3, we present the generic
architecture of Kapuer as well as its problem-solving model for
the machine learning algorithm. Section 4 details our Android
implementation. We analyze available security information
related to Android permissions and propose hierarchies of
criteria for Android. We evaluate Kapuer in Section 5 on a
real life scenario. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we summarize different works related to
Android permission management.
A. High level policies in Android
Access control models can be seen as design patterns to
help the specification of policies. They all consider three main
entities: the subject, the action, and the resource. In addition,
some access control models propose abstractions. For Barker
[3], these abstractions (he calls them categories) represent
“any of several fundamental and distinct classes or groups
to which entities may be assigned”. One of the advantages of
1http://repo.xposed.info/
using abstractions is simplifying policies. For instance, Role
Based Access Control (RBAC) [4] uses the concept of role to
group subjects according to their function in an organization.
Other access control models propose abstractions for other
elements. Organization Based Access Control (OrBAC) [5]
uses abstractions on all three main elements: roles abstract
subjects, activities are for actions and views for resources.
Some access control models are designed for privacy like
PBAC [6] that introduces the intent of the subject or P-
RBAC [7] that extends RBAC with concepts like purpose,
condition, and obligation. An exception is Attribute Based
Access Control (ABAC). ABAC does not introduce abstraction
but is a specification pattern to express authorization policies
using any abstraction.
Each model offers concepts and abstractions to guide se-
curity experts in the writing of policies. Even if analyzing
and implementing abstractions is time-consuming, resulting
authorization policies are more powerful and easier to manage.
But it requires security expertise for writing authorization
policies and most of mobile device users lack this skill.
Some systems already use access control models to enforce
Android permissions. For instance, CReˆPE [8] uses context-
related policies to control how applications can use their
permissions. Detection of contexts triggers the activation of
the policy to use. MOSES [9] is also a system enforcing
policy based security on Android. MOSES relies on system
compartmenting to create isolated areas. Each area can be
used to separate, for example, data and applications used for
work and those for personal use. Although both CReˆPE and
MOSES allow Android to enforce high-level policies, they did
not address the usability issue. Only skilled people can write
those policies or define contexts and security profiles.
B. Writing policies with a graphical editor
Until version 5.x, official Android releases did not provide
any efficient tools to manage permissions. Many custom
releases or applications give users a way to better control
permissions (such as Privacy Guard Manager, Permission Mas-
ter, XPrivacy or DonkeyGuard). Our study will concentrate
only on Privacy Guard Manager (PGM) from CyanogenMod2
since all other applications have the same drawback. PGM is
available in the settings menu of CyanogenMod and presents
all installed applications. For each application, there is the
list of its permissions. Users have the choice to select ON or
OFF for each application to allow or deny the permission. An
option also exists to ask users to decide at the first time the
permission is requested. Thus, the interface is very easy to
master and requires no technical skills: only a simple action
on the device for each permission.
Although the process is easy to learn, checking all per-
missions for every applications is painful. The survey from
Google3 in 2013 shows that a US smartphone’s user has
an average of 33 applications installed on his device. We
2http://www.cyanogenmod.org/
3http://think.withgoogle.com/mobileplanet/fr/
performed an analysis of the 50 most downloaded free appli-
cations on the Google Play Store and found that an application
asks for an average of 11.4 permissions. This gives us a
total of 376 permissions. Few users will browse the whole
list of permissions to protect their privacy. Although PGM
is interesting when dealing with few applications, current
smartphone environment is much more complex and using no
abstraction has difficulties facing scalability.
Google has improved its native permission management
approach in the latest version of Android (version 6.0). First,
permissions are requested at runtime (the first time appli-
cations require them) and users can change allowed/refused
permissions at any time. Now, Android application developers
shall manage the fact that their application may not have
access to all the permissions listed in the manifest file. Google
has also addressed the large number of permissions issue
by introducing protection levels and groups of permissions.
Each permission is associated to one of four protection lev-
els. Permissions with level normal are considered as low-
risk permissions and are automatically granted without any
user approval. Permissions with level signature are related to
communication between applications developed by the same
organization. The requesting application needs to be signed by
the same certificate as the application providing the service and
declaring the permission. In that case, the system automatically
grants the permission without any action required from the
user. Protection level signatureOrSystem works like signature
but concerns also the applications that are in the Android
system image. Finally, the last level, dangerous, contains
permissions with high risk for the user. There are 24 dan-
gerous permissions. To reduce this number, every dangerous
permission is attached to one permission group. Nine different
groups exist and each one of them represents a resource or a
set of resources like CALENDAR, CONTACTS or PHONE. For
example, the group CALENDAR consists in two permissions
read calendar and write calendar. To reduce the number of
interactions with the user, the new permission management
works as follows. When an application requests a dangerous
permission, Android does not ask the user to accept or deny
that particular permission. It asks the user to accept or deny
the whole permission group.
Thus, even if there are more than 130 permissions in
Android, a user will be asked to grant or refuse permissions to
a specific application only nine times at most (one per group).
Although this approach seems more user-friendly, it has signif-
icant drawbacks in terms of security. All permissions to access
any network services (3G/4G, NFC, Bluetooth) are associated
to protection level normal. As consequences, users cannot
control network access and any application can communicate
anywhere. In addition, this loss of control is increased by the
use of groups of permission. Indeed, users’ control regresses
even with dangerous permissions. For instance, group PHONE
includes seven permissions (use SIP, call phone, read phone
state, process outgoing calls, read call log, write call log
and add voicemail). Thus, when a Voice over IP application
requests permission use SIP which seems relevant, the user can
only grant the group of seven permissions. These permissions
are not all relevant to a VoIP application. Thus, to limit the
number of interactions with the users and cope with scalability,
Android 6.0 has decreased the privacy protection capability of
the system. These IBAC coarse-grained permissions only give
the user an illusion of control.
C. Writing policies with a text editor
Textual editors use specific languages to write authorization
policies. Textual editors are less accessible than graphical ones
because the language must be learned and understood before
writing anything. However, these languages provide much
more flexibility and the possibility to create very powerful
rules.
XACML V3 [10] (eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage) is a language standardized by OASIS, for writing
authorization policies. XACML uses attributes to build policies
thereby works great with ABAC. Every security element can
be represented as an attribute. Then it is possible to create
any kind of abstractions such as roles in RBAC, activities in
OrBAC, etc. Genericity and flexibility are the main advantages
of XACML but also its main flaw. Technical skills are re-
quired: understanding access control models to select suitable
abstractions and write policies according to them. In addition,
XACML is an XML language which is not known to be user-
friendly for non-technical people. Thus, the whole process
demands lots of technical skills and cannot be performed by
owners of smartphones.
Arena et al. [11] have proposed an XACML-based exten-
sion of the Android’s security framework called SecureDroid.
This tool allows users to define situations and specify which
permissions are accepted or denied in these situations. Users
can also be prompted when a permission is requested. This
approach do not use abstraction so scaling up is still a problem.
Stepien and al. [12] have worked on a graphical editor to help
non-technical users write XACML rules. With this editor, it
is possible to choose an attribute, an operator and a value
to compare to. It makes writing rules possible without using
an XML format. Nonetheless, understanding how abstractions
work is still required.
III. A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR WRITING HIGH
LEVEL POLICIES
Allowing non-technical users to write policies by them-
selves is not a simple task. A graphical editor like PGM is
easy to use but lacks efficiency. With hundreds of permissions
to handle, using abstractions seems mandatory. These abstrac-
tions can be specified with textual editors but it requires a lot of
technical skills and then it is not accessible to the public. Non-
technical users should be helped by a security expert to write
authorization policies to protect their privacy but, of course, it
is not possible to have an expert behind every smartphone user.
Since none of these approaches is satisfying, we present our
work which aims at: i) requiring no skill before being used
like PGM, ii) allowing non-technical users to write policies
with abstractions.
We have chosen to create a Decision Support System (DSS)
to help users to write their complex policies [13]. DSS are a
set of methods and techniques used to help someone facing a
problem to make a decision [14]. We use a DSS to interact
with users and understand how they wants to protect their
data. We present in this Section our system, named Kapuer,
applied to Android permission management. It informs users
when applications request permissions, it learns how users
react to requests and it uses these preferences to propose
abstract authorization rules. Kapuer consists in an architecture
to interact with users and control applications, and a problem-
solving model to learn users’ preferences.
A. Introduction to Decision Support System
The main goal of a Decision Support System is not to
make the decision on behalf of the user but instead to give
him precious information to understand the situation, to give
parts of solutions or possible alternatives to allow him to
make the final decision [14]. Among the different approaches
of DSS, we have focused on recommender systems. These
systems work with a profile of the user. It filter and analyze
information, extract the most useful to build knowledge about
users, their preferences. By learning these preferences, the
system is able to propose solutions to the user by analyzing
new information each time new preferences are acquired.
Thereby, the system is always learning and adapting itself to
the user. Three types of recommender systems exist [15]:
1) Content-based recommendations rely only on objects
characteristics to make propositions. All available information
on the object can be used to describe it. For example, a book
can be described by a title, an author, a release date, etc.
To make recommendations, the system compares objects to
find those that seems to be the closest to the user’s prefer-
ences. Content-based recommendations are very interesting
with detailed objects. Because they are seen as a set of
characteristics, a new object can be immediately proposed to
users if its characteristics fit their preferences. If users have
always the same behavior, the system will always propose
relevant objects. The drawback is the starting: when the system
has no information about user’s preferences, a learning period
is required before propositions can be relevant. Similarly, if
users suddenly changes their behavior, there will be a certain
latency before the system learns those changes.
2) Recommendations by collaborative filtering work with
the preferences of all people using the system. The idea is
if one user has similar preferences with other users, then he
should like objects chosen by such users. Thereby, they can
be relevant recommendations for him. Unlike content-based,
the system does not need much information to start. It will
quickly find other people with a close profile. Collaborative
filtering also works fine with objects that are hard to describe
like emotions. This approach also has some drawbacks. When
few people are using the system, finding a similar profile might
fail. In this case, recommendations will not be relevant. In the
same way, if a new object is added to the system, as long as
it is not chosen by some users, it will not be recommended.
3) Hybrid systems uses both content-based and collaborative
filtering. It allows getting rid of some flaws of each approach.
Content-based recommendations for new objects in the system,
collaborative filtering for users with few information to work
with. A well known hybrid recommender system is used by
Amazon to create lists of similar items when a customer visits
the page of an object or adds one in his basket.
Despite the hybrid recommender system advantages, we
chose a pure content-based approach in Kapuer for two
reasons. Firstly, using collaborative filtering requires storing
every user’s privacy preferences somewhere on a server.
Protection of users’ preferences is complex [16][17]. With
a content-based recommender system, user’s preferences are
stored locally and are not shared at all. Secondly, privacy
recommendation can also be provided by a set of experts
like in [18]. We think that privacy is by nature personal
and these solutions do not allow experts to customize their
recommendations to specific users. E.g., the four authors of
this article do not agree on what access should be granted to
the Facebook app.
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Fig. 1. The architecture of Kapuer
B. Architecture of Kapuer
Figure 1 shows the architecture of Kapuer with a clear
distinction between the XACML access control part and the
decision support part. The process begins when an application
requests the access to one of the user’s private information.
This request is intercepted by the Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) (step 1) that creates a request in the XACML V3 format
and transmits it to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) (step 2).
The PDP is the decision unit; it compares the request with the
access control policy. If one of the rules matches, the PDP
sends back the associated decision (Permit or Deny) to the
PEP which applies it on the Android system. If there is no
matching, the PDP returns a “Not Applicable” decision to the
PEP. No matching rule means that our system needs to learn
more about the user’s preferences about this request. As a
consequence, the PEP transfers the request to the DSS. To
get more information about the user’s preferences, the DSS
interacts with him. Kapuer has two sorts of interactions with
the user:
1) When a request is sent by the PEP to the DSS (step 3),
Kapuer informs the user that an application wants to access
one of his private data. If possible, details about the request
are also given such as similar applications asking for the same
permission or indications about the permission asked. The
user just needs to accept or decline that request. Making a
decision in the appropriate context (i.e. when the user runs
the application) is easier than doing it out of the context
of use; it limits the cognitive load. Once the user has made
his decision, the DSS creates the corresponding XACML V3
rule for that specific couple (application, permission) and puts
it in the policy database (step 4). Then, all the preferences
regarding the attributes used in the request are updated (more
information on the preferences update can be found in [2]).
When the update process is completed, Kapuer calculates a
score reflecting the user’s preferences knowledge level.
2) When the score of a request reaches a predetermined
threshold (found by experimentations), the system has ac-
quired enough information to propose a new abstracted rule
that covers a broader range of access requests. In this interac-
tion, Kapuer presents this rule to the user and explains all the
abstract elements (step 5). For example, if a rule is proposed
for all game applications, Kapuer lists all games. If a rule is
proposed for all resources linked to networks, it details all the
associated permissions. This way, user are informed and even
without any technical skills, they are able to understand what
the rule means. Then they can accept or reject the proposed
rule. If accepted, the DSS transforms the rule in XACML V3
and adds it to the policy database (step 4 again).
C. Our problem solving model
The main objective of Kapuer is learning users’ preferences
to recommend them high-level rules. The DSS extracts data
from requests and analyzes them with the user’s decision. In
order to explain how Kapuer learns the users’ preferences, we
must first present our problem-solving model. This model is
independent of any access control model and is based on four
elements :
• Criteria - A criterion is the basic and main element of our
problem-solving model. It represents an attribute of an
access request like the name of an application, a resource
or an action. We have defined criteria to be very similar
to attributes in ABAC. An attribute-based request can be
easily converted into a list of criteria. The set of criteria
is noted CR. Criteria are composed of an identifier
and two values. The first value, gt : CR → [0,∞[,
increments each time the user accepts a request including
this criterion. The second value, f t : CR→ [0,∞[, incre-
ments each time the user refuses a request including this
criterion. The preferences score regarding this criterion
can be found by subtracting f t and gt. This dual unipolar
scale gives much more information than a unique bipolar
scale. We can easily differentiate if a criterion has a low
preferences value because we have few information on
user’s preferences or because users do not always behave
in the same way (sometimes they accept requests with
this criterion and sometimes they deny them).
• Classes of criteria - We introduce the notion of class
of criteria to express security objects introduced in the
access control models like visibility, temporal and spatial
aspects, retention or purpose. Each criterion is part of a
class with relation Association Criterion Class: ACC ⊆
CR × C where the set of class of criteria is noted C.
It is possible to create any class depending on the type
of data the system uses. The set of criteria of a class is
defined by the function class :
class : C → PCR
x 7→ {y ∈ CR|(y, C) ∈ ACC} (1)
• Meta-criteria - Access control models propose abstrac-
tions of security objects. We define the notion of meta-
criterion to represent these abstractions. For instance,
“Games” is a meta-criterion for applications describing
this kind of application. A meta-criterion is a criterion,
with the same structure but with a higher level of ab-
straction. The set of meta-criteria is noted MCR where
MCR ⊂ CR. A meta-criterion is also part of a class.
Each criterion is linked to one meta-criterion of the
same class. A meta-criterion can be linked to another
meta-criterion of a higher level. Then, we can create
a hierarchy of criteria and meta-criteria for each class.
Values of meta-criteria are updated each time a criterion
or a meta-criterion linked to it is updated. Then if a
criterion is updated, all meta-criteria in the same branch
of the hierarchy are also updated.
• Groups of criteria - We have defined groups of criteria to
represent relations between criteria or meta-criteria from
different classes. A group of criteria is formed by at least
two criteria and at most by the number of classes. A group
has his own preferences values, they are not calculated
from the values of the criteria or meta-criteria present
in the group. Values of groups are updated each time
all the criteria or meta-criteria of the group are present
in a request. The larger a group is, the more detailed
information about users preferences it gives. Thus, larger
group are more important. The set of groups of criteria
G is defined by:
G ⊆ PCR
A group of criteria is composed by at least two criteria.
∀g ∈ G, |g| ≥ 2
Two criteria of a same group cannot belong to the same
class.
∀g ∈ G, ∀(c1, c2) ∈ g × g, c1 6= c2 ⇒ class(c1) 6=
class(c2)
This solving problem model is implemented by our aggre-
gation operator, called Kagop, to calculate scores of requests
and propose abstract rules (more information on Kagop are
available in [2]).
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IV. THE ANDROID IMPLEMENTATION
Due to Android 4.4 security protections, it is not possible
to intercept permission requests in an application, they must
be intercepted directly from the OS. It has forced us to use the
framework XPosed which allows modifying the source code of
Android without the need to make a custom release. With the
help of XPosed and the Balana4 implementation of XACML
V3, we built the module Kapuer for Android 4.4. We describe
in this Section the instantiation of our problem-solving model
to Android, the interactions during the learning phase and
finally abstract authorization rules management functionalities.
When Kapuer intercepts a permission request, information
about the application and the permission is collected. Thus,
we have defined three classes to implement our problem
solving model: Applications, Actions and Resources. Criteria
of class Applications are represented by the name of the
applications installed on the device. Kapuer gets the first
level of meta-criteria from the application categories provided
by the Google Play Store (e.g., games, entertainment, work,
etc.). We have created a meta-criterion called no category
4https://github.com/wso2/balana
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Fig. 4. Hierarchy of criteria for class Actions
for applications not included in the Google Play Store. Fi-
nally, we added meta-criterion all applications to group all
the meta-criteria of this class (Figure 2). Criteria of classes
Actions and Resources are extracted from the permissions
(e.g., “android.permission.READ CALENDAR” contains cri-
teria READ and CALENDAR). We chose for class Resources
to use meta-criteria media, network, service, user data and
system data. We added meta-criteria hardware (superior to
media, network, service) and data (superior to user data and
system data). Finally, the root of this hierarchy is meta-
criterion all resources (Figure 3). With the same reasoning,
we have extracted criteria from the permission list for class
Actions. We have defined three meta-criteria : local access
(regrouping criteria execute, control, read and write), external
access (regrouping criteria send and receive) and the root of
the hierarchy called all actions (Figure 4).
Figures 5 and 6 shows the interactions with the user during
the learning phase. Interaction in Figure 5 is displayed when
Kapuer has no rule to handle the request and asks the user
to make a decision (corresponds to the step 3 in Figure 1).
Interaction in Figure 6 is displayed when Kapuer has enough
information on the user’s preferences and proposes a high-
level rule (step 5 in Figure 1). If offers information about all
abstractions used in the rule. In this example, there are only
meta-criteria so we detail all criteria contained in each meta-
criteria to help the user understand exactly what this new rule
will do if the user accepts it.
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Fig. 5. Interactions of Kapuer during the learning phase
Kapuer offers also an interface for viewing the privacy
policy and features to modify it. Figures 7, 8 and 9 shows three
screenshots of the application. Users can access the list of all
rules and have a description for each one (Figure 7). They can
also edit each rule and modify it on four parts: the application,
the resource, the action or the decision (Figure 8). Except
for the decision, they can modify the level of abstraction if
needed. We added a summary of all permissions granted to an
application (Figure 9). This view provides detailed information
about permissions handled by Kapuer.
V. EVALUATION OF KAPUER FOR MANAGING ANDROID
PERMISSIONS
We evaluate in this Section Kapuer’s efficiency. Firstly, we
compare it to PGM in a real scenario. Secondly, we evaluate
the speed of the learning process.
A. Kapuer VS Privacy Guard Manager
We wanted to test the approach with a real life situation.
First, we installed the 50 most downloaded free applications in
the Google Play Store. It resulted in 28 games, 4 social apps, 4
communication apps, 4 widgets apps, 3 tools, 3 entertainment
apps, 2 apps about music and 2 apps about travel. Then, we
defined the following arbitrary high-level authorization policy
we want to enforce on our Android device:
• rule 1: Games can access the Internet.
• rule 2: Social applications can access network and system
data.
• rule 3: Communication applications can access network
and services.
• rule 4: Widget applications can access the Internet.
• rule 5: Music&Audio applications can access network
and audio.
• rule 6: Tools applications can access everything.
• rule 7: Travel&Local applications can access network and
GPS.
• rule 8: Entertainment applications can access the Internet.
Fig. 6. Proposition of a new high level rule
Fig. 7. Rule information screen
Fig. 8. Rule modification screen
We want to evaluate the cost of writing this high-level policy
using PGM and Kapuer. This cost is calculated by the number
of actions the user has to perform. For PGM, an action consists
in all pressures (screen navigation and on/off flipswitches
selection). For Kapuer, any interaction as explained in Figures
5 and 6 is an action. Since Kapuer learning process is not
predetermined and depends on the received requests, a large
number of tests must be executed to get its average behavior.
Thus, we used our simulator [19] that can automate this task.
This simulator is able to generate random requests based on
a set of possible accesses. It also automates the user behavior
by accepting or denying requests based on a predefined high-
level policy. We ran 10 simulations with the same high-level
policy but with different requests each time since they are
generated randomly. After each simulation, we checked the
rules recommended by Kapuer.
Figure 10 illustrates the number of actions needed to write
each rule of our privacy policy. It also shows that Kapuer needs
fewer actions than Privacy Guard Manager for each rule. There
is even a huge difference on the first rule. It concerns all the
applications with the category “Games” and they represent 28
Fig. 9. Application information screen
applications out of 50 so more than the half. For this rule,
Kapuer needs 61 actions and PGM 476, so nearly eight times
more. For rules number 2 and 3, the difference between Kapuer
and PGM is also important when it is closer for all the others.
This is due to the few number of applications involved in the
last rules. If we compare the whole policy, Kapuer required
190 actions only when PGM has needed 848 actions. The
abstractions in the high-level rules proposed by Kapuer are
really providing a faster process for the user to fulfill his
privacy policy. We have also looked at these high-level rules in
details to see if some of them do not fit the user’s preferences.
None of the created rules proposed the opposite of what the
high-level policy stated. Nevertheless, some of them did not
have the right level of abstraction. It happens that a rule is
proposed to the user with a higher abstraction than needed so
it does not totally fit the user’s behavior.
B. Evaluation of the speed at which Kapuer learns privacy
preferences
The number of interactions needed to recreate one rule or
all the policy provides information about the effort needed by
users. It is also interesting to see how fast Kapuer is learning
and how the level of completeness progresses. We compared,
for each simulation, how many requests were needed to reach,
20%, 50%, 80% and 100% of completeness. The results are
shown in Figure 11. At the beginning, Kapuer does not know
anything about the user’s preferences. It needs requests to
learn his behavior and to start proposing high-level rules. The
first rule is proposed on average after 50 requests. Then, the
average number of requests to reach the first threshold, 20%
of completeness, is 75. For the second threshold, 50%, the
average number of requests is 104. For the 80% threshold,
the average number of requests is 123 and finally 100% of
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Fig. 10. Comparison of Privacy Guard Manager and Kapuer
Fig. 11. Completeness for each rule
Fig. 12. Average of completeness
completeness needs an average of 190 requests. From these
simulations, we calculated the global average completeness.
Figure 12 shows the average of completeness at 10%, 20%,
30% etc. It confirms that after learning from the firsts requests,
Kapuer proposes regularly rules until the policy is nearly
complete. Then, the process to achieve 100% of completeness
is slower. This learning speed could still be improved. Today,
Kapuer starts without any initialization and has to learn
users preferences from scratch. With an initialization on these
preferences, the number of requests needed to propose the first
rule could be reduced.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented in this article a tool for permission
management on Android. Unlike other approaches, Kapuer
does not only provide a way to modify what permissions an
application can use. It learns from users’ behavior to help
them and advise them by proposing rules with different levels
of abstractions. This way, they can protect their privacy more
easily, without needing knowledge about access control mod-
els or policy’s structure. Our evaluations show that hundreds
of permissions can be handled with a limited number of
actions by using abstractions. When Android 6.0 sacrifices
control of privacy for the sake of simplicity with concepts
of protection levels and groups of permissions, Kapuer learns
and proposes both fine-grained and abstract privacy rules. In
addition, Kapuer supplies users with features to control the
level of abstraction of privacy rules.
The current version of Kapuer runs on Android 4.4. For
short term future works, we will upgrade it to Android 6.0
in order to benefit from new features introduced by this
system. For the moment, each time a request is denied, Kapuer
makes Android act as if the application does not have the
permission. Since developers of Android 4.4 applications do
not manage this case, some applications crashed. This issue
will be resolved on Android 6.0 because now developers shall
handle permission verification before trying to use it. We will
also take advantage of the new Android permission request
interception to implement our interactions with users. Finally,
we will integrate new Android 6.0 information (protection
levels and groups of permission) as new meta-criteria. As a
consequence, Kapuer will be easier to maintain.
One of the initial goal when we designed Kapuer was to
inform people about privacy risks. For longer term research,
we want to go further in that direction and not only inform
people but also educate them about privacy issues. As an
example, explain them the consequences of granting some
permissions to an application. The more people understand
these risks, the better their privacy decisions will be.
Finally, Kapuer learns users preferences from scratch. A
large number of requests is needed before any proposition can
be made to the user. It is possible to improve the beginning of
the learning phase by initializing the system. We are currently
making surveys with different kind of users to find the best
way to initialize these users’ preferences.
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